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Abstract
Under the bond scheme, a pre-determined series of payments would compensate 
farmers for lost revenues resulting from policy change. Unlike the Single Payment 
Scheme, payments would be fully decoupled: recipients would not have to retain 
farmland, or remain in agriculture. If vested in a paper asset, the guaranteed, 
unencumbered, income stream would be similar to that from a government bond. 
Recipients could exchange this for a capital sum reflecting the net present value 
of future payments, and reinvest in other business ventures, either on- or off-
farm. With a finite, declining flow of payments, budget expenditure would reduce, 
releasing funds for other uses.
9A.1 Introduction
Agricultural economists have long debated the rationale for government 
intervention in the agricultural sector to correct market failures and address 
income disparities. Many have suggested that such intervention is too pervasive, 
is too focused on ‘income’ support, and ought to be reduced. Nash (1965), having 
advocated such an approach, wrote:
‘It is evident … that some method must be found of compensating those 
whose incomes are reduced by this abolition of the price guarantees. 
… It might … take the form of [a] personal annuity payable to all those 
at present engaged in farming for the remainder of their lives.
The essential requirements are that the payments should not be 
related to future output and should not in any way influence future 
productive decisions; that they should not affect the choice of any 
individual whether to remain in farming or to enter an alternative 
occupation; that the right to participate in them should be limited to 
those now engaged in farming; and that the payments should have a 
fixed term.’
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There are several reasons why governments might be willing to compensate 
groups adversely impacted by policy change. If the group is politically important 
it might be necessary to offer compensation to ‘buy’ their support. A government 
that reneges on its policy commitments might lose credibility, and ultimately its 
political authority, if it is perceived to engage in ‘unfair’ policy changes, particularly 
if the electorate cannot readily recognise broader economic benefits. Furthermore, 
radical, and rapid, policy change could have far-reaching consequences. Changes 
in farm support, for example, would reverberate throughout the rural economy, 
with bankruptcies triggered in agriculture’s ancillary industries. A compensation 
scheme would allow businesses time to adjust. Welfare economics can also be 
invoked: the weak version holds that a Pareto improvement in welfare occurs if 
those that gain from policy change could compensate the losers; the strong version 
is that there is a Pareto improvement only if those that gain do compensate those 
that lose.
9A.2 Characteristics of a bond scheme
Although the proposal of Nash (1965) was not quite the bond scheme later advocated 
by Tangermann (1991), it did contain most of the key features. As rearticulated 
by Swinbank and Tangermann (S&T) (2004), the scheme was unambiguously 
seen as a compensation payment for policy change, allowing the sector time to 
adjust. It was framed to replace the area and headage payments that had been 
introduced into the CAP by the Mac Sharry reforms of 1992, but the principles 
could be extended to other sectors benefiting from price support. It was presented 
as having six components. Initially, payments would be decoupled from crops 
grown (component one) and animals kept (component two), with future payments 
linked only to past entitlements. The level of compensation would be a political 
decision: S&T suggested that, initially, payments should reflect receipts from area 
and headage payments during an earlier representative period. Essentially, this 
is what happened when the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) was introduced by the 
Fischler reforms of 2003, particularly for those products, and in those regions, 
where so-called ‘full decoupling’ applied.
Component three was to decouple the payments from land (or the farm) and attach 
the entitlement to ‘farmers’ (whatever their legal form). Thus, recipients would 
continue to receive payments even if they left farming. Clearly the SPS is rather 
different in this regard: recipients have to be active farmers, there is an annual 
claim on farmland at the recipient’s disposal and matched by SPS entitlements 
denominated in hectares, and various cross-compliance conditions apply, as 
explained in Chapter 9. This led Swinbank and Tranter (2005) to query whether 
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the SPS really did meet all the criteria of the WTO’s green box. However, unlike the 
Nash scheme, under which payments would only continue during the lifetime of 
the original recipient, bond scheme entitlements would be inheritable.
The EU would guarantee the period over which compensation payments would 
be made (component four), and the future level of payments would be irrevocably 
fixed (component five). S&T envisaged a phased reduction in payment levels over 
a 15-year period, but this too would be a decision based on political expediency. 
Finally (component six), S&T considered that banks and other financial institutions 
would be willing to lend on the basis of a government-backed assurance of a future 
stream of decoupled payments. So they suggested the EU should go further and 
facilitate such transactions by issuing the entitlement as a government bond (with 
annual payments only, and no capital sum on maturity).
9A.3 Advantages and disadvantages
S&T stressed two important advantages of the bond scheme. First, it ‘locked in’ the 
policy reform: once the bonds had been issued, the level of compensation could 
not be changed without affecting the value of the bond. Second, the scheme did not 
adversely affect the profile of CAP budget expenditure. In year one, expenditure 
on compensation payments would simply replace what would have been spent 
on the redundant schemes, and thereafter it could decline on an annual basis, 
releasing funds for Pillar 2 activities or other uses. This is in marked contrast to 
most proposals for ‘buy-out’ schemes, under which government budgets are called 
upon to pay compensation up-front, in one lump sum. However, bond recipients 
are able to trade their future entitlement for a capital sum, reflecting the present 
value of a bond’s future government-guaranteed income stream. This could then 
be used to reinvest in the farm business, to buy a retirement annuity, etc. The bond 
scheme is about as decoupled as is possible, but it could affect the opportunity cost 
of capital for farm investment purposes, it might change the recipient’s perception 
of risk, and some farmers might use the payments to subsidise their continuation 
in farming.
S&T also identified potential problems. A bond scheme, unlike the SPS, cannot 
be used to enforce cross-compliance, as the land user is no longer, necessarily, 
the recipient of the annual payment. Payments might not be treated as ‘farm 
income’ for income tax purposes. And, where landowners and land users are not 
the same legal entity, there are potential issues over capital values. Economic 
theory suggests that farm income support, including the ‘old’ CAP’s market price 
support mechanisms, and the area payment scheme introduced by the Mac Sharry 
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reform, is in part capitalised into land values, to the benefit of landowners. With a 
bond scheme, support previously capitalised into land values switches to the bond. 
However, S&T envisaged that the bond would be issued to the ‘farmer’, who might 
be renting land, and who would then be free to renounce the tenancy without 
compensating the landowner.
Another drawback is political: politicians would prefer to prevaricate rather than 
announce the future date on which CAP support will end. Daugbjerg (2003) reports 
on the failed Danish initiative to introduce the bond scheme into the Mac Sharry 
reform debate, and Mac Sharry’s comment that it ‘would imply ending support to 
most Community farmers after a given period.’
One concern about decoupling schemes is that, if farmers receive payments 
irrespective of land use, marginal land might be abandoned, particularly in areas of 
extensive goat, sheep and cattle farming. Tranter et al. (2007) reported the findings 
of a survey in Germany, Portugal and the UK about how farmers might respond 
to various decoupling scenarios. In effect, 33% of respondents in the UK, 22% 
in Germany and 18% in Portugal said: ‘we would carry on as before, making no 
changes at all to our farming systems.’
9A.4 Contrasts with the Single Payment Scheme
Table 9A.1 summarises three key differences. The purpose of the bond scheme 
is to compensate a group of stakeholders (but possibly not landlords) for policy 
change. The SPS, according to Regulation 1782/2003, is a form of ‘income support 
for farmers’; although, as pointed out in Chapter 9, payments tend to be highly 
skewed, reflecting the size of farm business and past farming activities, and it is 
rather difficult to discern its income objectives.
The profile of payments under the bond scheme, once fixed, would be inviolable, 
unlike with the SPS. The Health Check, for example, increased the rate of 
modulation, and the Financial Discipline provisions might yet apply. The Health 
Check also allows, indeed encourages, Member States to switch from the historic 
mode of payment to a regionalised mode, involving a redistribution of payments 
(see Chapter 9). Bonds, once issued, would be completely guaranteed for their full 
term: with the SPS, there is considerable uncertainty about its availability after 2013, 
when the present budget settlement (the Financial Perspective 2007-2013) expires.
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9A.5 A future bond scheme?
Although the 2003 CAP reforms progressed the decoupling of EU farm support, 
the SPS is not a fully-decoupled policy, and policy-makers continue to debate the 
need for, and scope of, policies to secure rural livelihoods and food supplies, and 
to protect the environment. The bond scheme, or further elaborations of it, could 
yet be deployed to ease any transition towards these ends. There are similarities, 
for example, between the bond scheme and the ideas of Delpla and Wyplosz (2007) 
in France, and the buy-out schemes advocated by James and Griswold (2007) and 
Citigroup (Stokes, 2007) in the USA.
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linked to farm land; cross-compliance 
applies
Certainty Fixed entitlements, paid for a fixed and 
finite period
Entitlements can be varied, and their 
future (post-2013) is uncertain
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